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ABSTRACT 
To assess the risk of a loan applicant defaulting, lenders 
feed applicants‟ data into credit scoring algorithms.  They 
are always looking to improve the effectiveness of their 
predictions, which means improving the algorithms and/or 
collecting different data.  Research on financial behavior 
found that elements of a person‟s family history and social 
ties can be good predictors of financial responsibility and 
control.  Our study investigated how loan applicants 
applying for a credit card would respond to questions such 
as “Did any of your loved ones die while you were growing 
up?” 48 participants were asked to complete a new type of 
credit card application form containing such requests as part 
of a “Consumer Acceptance Test” of a credit card with 
lower interest rates, but only available to “financially 
responsible customers.”  This was a double-blind study – 
the experimenters processing participants were told exactly 
the same.  We found that: (1) more sensitive items are 
disclosed less often - e.g. friends‟ names and contact had 
only a 69% answer rate; (2) privacy fundamentalists are 5.6 
times less likely to disclose data; and (3) providing a 
justification for a question has no effect on its answer rate.  
Discrepancies between acceptability and disclosure were 
observed – e.g. 43% provided names and contact of friends, 
having said they found the question unacceptable.  We 
conclude that collecting data items not traditionally seen as 
relevant could be made acceptable if lenders can credibly 
establish relevance, and assure applicants they will be 
assessed fairly. More research needs to be done on how to 
best communicate these qualities. 
INTRODUCTION 
To lend money responsibly, as well as protect their own 
business, lenders assess the risk of applicants not repaying 
their loans.  For the assessment process, lenders collect 
personal data items directly from applicants, and from 
organizations such as credit reference agencies, and feed 
the data collected into their credit scoring algorithms.  The 
lenders will reject loan requests from applicants who fall 
above a certain risk threshold.  The goal is to ensure that the 
lending business remains profitable, but it also prevents 
applicants who would not be able to afford the loan from 
getting into financial hardship. 
Lenders are continuously looking to improve the accuracy 
of their risk assessments, either by improving the 
algorithms used, or by collecting new types of data.  Based 
on the literature on credit scoring and interviews with 
experts in personal finance and credit risk, we identified 
factors that seem to be associated with financial behavior, 
but are not widely used (and if they are used, the general 
public is not aware of it).  These include a person‟s 
relationship with parents while growing up (Hunt & Fry, 
2009; Pine & Gnessen, 2009), social links (Glaeser et al., 
1999), bill payment history (Belsky & Calder, 2004, 
Microbilt, 2011) among others.  Such data is clearly 
sensitive, but using it in this way is no different from how 
health data is used by insurance companies, and 
psychometric and drug tests data by some companies to 
assess job applicants. But such data could also be beneficial 
for some loan applicants: new types of data with predictive 
value could help those with „thin‟ credit histories, who 
currently find themselves excluded from many financial 
services because they cannot prove their creditworthiness. 
We first review the literature on credit scoring, and present 
results from interviews with experts in personal finance and 
credit risk; we then discuss factors known to influence 
privacy perceptions of individuals.  We then present a study 
in which participants were asked to complete a credit card 
application in which they had to disclose data commonly 
requested in this process, and some alternative data. The 
results from the experiment and the post-experiment 
questionnaire show that providing justifications for 
questions has no effect on disclosure rates. Surprisingly, 
participants did disclose some data they rated as 
“unacceptable for lenders to request”, but were less likely 
to disclose such information about people other than 
themselves.  We conclude that lenders should avoid 
collecting indices of social capital for the time being, and 
should keep in mind the potential mismatch between the 
perceived relevance of a data request and its actual 
relevance in an empirically based credit scoring algorithm. 
BACKGROUND 
Credit Scoring 
Credit can be a force for good: it can be an investment - for 
example, buying a car might enable someone to obtain job 
which they otherwise might not be able to get to, or it can 
help to manage unexpected expenses, such as emergency 
repairs.   However, individuals obtaining loans they cannot 
repay has serious consequences on their lives, as well as the 
lenders‟ balance sheets:  in the UK, for instance, 331 people 
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are declared insolvent or bankrupt every day (Credit 
Action, 2011). 
To minimize the number of loan defaults and maximize 
profit (not giving a loan to applicants who could repay it 
equals lost profit), lenders assess the likelihood that an 
applicant will repay a loan.  This process is known as credit 
scoring, first used in the 1940s, when it relied on human 
judgement: credit analysts read an application form and 
making a decision based on the 5 C‟s (Thomas, 2000): “the 
character of the person (do you know the person or their 
family?); the capital (how much is being asked for?); the 
collateral (what is the applicant willing to put up from their 
own resources?); the capacity (what is their repaying 
ability.  How much free income do they have?); the 
condition (what are the conditions in the market?)”. 
Today, credit scoring is based on automatic statistical 
algorithms which are fed data from the applicant‟s 
application form, data related to past dealings with the 
lender, and their credit report – obtained from a credit 
bureau (see, for example: RBS, 2011).  The risk of an 
applicant defaulting is inferred from the performance of 
borrowers whose data profile is similar (Collard and 
Kempton, 2005; Jentzsch, 2010).  Credit scoring algorithms 
are faster, more consistent and less prejudiced than human 
decision makers, and  there is evidence that these 
algorithms are better predictors of which applicants would 
be “good” or “bad” customers (Thomas, 2000). 
But credit scoring algorithms are not perfect. Mistakes 
occur in the classification of some applicants (good risks 
classified as bad risks and vice-versa), because of 
limitations in the building of the algorithms themselves 
(data used to develop predictive models sometimes has poor 
quality and is based only on samples of accepted borrowers; 
Hand, 2001), interactions between variables that become 
outdated (people‟s behavior changes over time), and 
because some factors that are the cause of bankruptcy are 
difficult to predict – e.g. divorce, health problems or 
unemployment.  (Expert 1, 2010; Jentzsch, 2007).  To 
improve the accuracy of their credit scoring, lenders can 
improve the way their algorithms are built - by adjusting 
how variables are transformed - or by collecting more data.  
The latter is seen as a more promising approach because the 
statistical methods underlying credit scoring are well 
understood, and no imminent breakthroughs in improving 
their performance is expected (Expert 1, 2010). 
Alternative Indicators 
Based in our review of literature on personal credit 
(Brostoff et al., 2011), and interviews with experts on credit 
risk and financial behavior, we identified several types of 
data that are potential indicators of financial behavior, but 
which are not currently requested in loan applications.  
These types of data include: bill payments (other than 
utilities), tax payments, employer recommendations, health 
condition, stability in life, and social relationships. 
Utility payments, for example, are considered to be a 
measure of willingness to pay debts.  There have been 
initiatives in the US for applicants with no traditional credit 
history to use their history of utility payments as a measure 
of their willingness to pay, and these data have been 
incorporated into credit report products offered by 
mainstream credit reference agencies – for example the 
“PRBC credit report with FICO expansion score” from Fair 
Isaac.  Some utility payments are now part of the UK credit 
bureau data, but it is not clear whether applicants realize 
this, or how they would perceive an explicit request for this 
data.  Data such as TV license payments are not yet 
collected, and it is not clear to what extent applicants 
consider them to be utilities (as opposed to less socially 
acceptable categories of expenditure), and how this 
personal classification might be reflected in perceptions of 
requests for the data.   
The same applies to accommodation-related payments.  
Rent (Microbilt, 2011) and Council Tax payments indicate 
that the applicant makes regular payments and demonstrates 
responsible behavior.  A larger number of insurance claims 
might also indicate that you‟re a riskier person (resulting in 
higher insurance premiums).  Too many may indicate a 
propensity for fraud. 
Sometimes employers vouch for new employees, so that 
they can get bank accounts (Expert 2, 2009).  A 
recommendation from the employer could therefore 
function as signal for creditworthiness. 
Health condition may also be linked to ability to repay.  
Body-mass index (BMI), for example, has been linked to 
some aspects of self-control (Junger & Kampen, 2010), 
which can be perceived as being related to ability to pay.  
Also, some lenders purchase insurance to recover the loan 
in the case of the borrower‟s death, and these policies 
require declarations of health and pre-existing conditions.  
Health checks can reveal lifestyle choices that correlate 
with responsibility and self-control, and ability to pay back 
loans.  Moreover, mental illness, disability, and physical 
illness are large risk factors for borrowers not paying back 
debts (Expert 3, 2009). 
Stability in applicants‟ lives is a key predictor for 
creditworthiness.  One way to assess stability is by asking 
whether the applicant lives with a partner or spouse (Expert 
4, 2009).  Kirchler et al. (2008) suggest that relationship 
dynamics can have an impact on credit decisions, with 
mutual social influence of the partners potentially changing 
their behavior. 
Stability and attitudes to money are also corrected with 
experiences while growing up. Analysis of case studies of 
over-spenders found that these often have a family 
background where money was used as a method of control, 
where the relationships with fathers were problematic and 
distant  and mediated by money (Pine & Gnessen, 2009), 
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and where the patient had experienced major and 
unresolved loss (Hunt & Fry, 2009). 
In a study that examined the performance of listings in a 
peer-to-peer lending service (Prosper), the structural 
component “degree centrality” of the applicant‟s social 
network was related to their probability of being granted a 
loan: applicants who had more friends and were more 
central in their social networks were more likely to receive 
loans.  Lin et al.  (2009) found that the number and type of 
friends an applicant had was related to how likely they were 
to receive a loan – with likelihood increasing with the 
number of friends who were lenders on Prosper.  Friend 
lists may therefore be used as a way of estimating social 
capital – if an applicant has friends who are rich, powerful 
and trustworthy, then s/he is seen as trustworthy and less 
risky to lend to.  It is also seen to assist fraud prevention 
because such connections facilitate tracing of a defaulting 
borrower who has changed address.  Similarly, the names, 
addresses and phone numbers of people that know you well 
could be obtained.  This is already done by some sub-prime 
lenders (Jones, 2001).  Although Lin et al.  (2009) did not 
study it, it is plausible that some measure of message flow 
between an applicant and their social network is an 
indication of the strength of ties between that applicant and 
their network, and so could be used as an index of social 
capital, and therefore trustworthiness to receive loans. 
Privacy Factors 
Even though the data items discussed above could 
potentially improve the assessment, their use by lenders 
raises the number of questions.  The key one – which we 
address in this study - is whether requesting them would 
raise privacy concerns.  Past research has identified 3 
criteria that are like to impact applicants‟ privacy 
perceptions: sensitivity, transparency, and privacy values.   
Sensitivity 
Adams and Sasse (2001) investigated privacy perceptions 
from a user-centric perspective, and found that users‟ 
assessment of privacy risks depends on three main factors: 
(1) information receiver; (2) information usage; and (3) 
information sensitivity.  The first factor refers to how much 
the user trusts the person or people who will have access to 
their data.  The second factor addresses the way users think 
receivers use their data in the present, and are going to use 
it in the future.  When individuals perceive that they have 
some degree of control over future usage of their personal 
data, they react in a more positive manner to its collection 
(Culnan, 1993).  The third factor consists of the users‟ 
perceptions of the data being disclosed and how others (e.g. 
the receivers) will interpret it.  Believing that data portrays 
individuals in a fair and accurate manner is an important 
acceptance factor – from a privacy perspective - of 
technologies and processes that collect personal data 
(Culnan, 1993; Malheiros et al., 2011).  Metzger (2007) 
investigated the effect of sensitivity on disclosure and found 
individuals were more likely to withhold items they found 
more sensitive.   
We believe that the different data sensitivities of the various 
items requested will have an impact on disclosure rates.  
Consequently, we propose that: 
H1: The proportion of participants disclosing each data 
item will be correlated with the sensitivity of the data 
items. 
Transparency 
Relevance or legitimacy of the data request in the context of 
the interaction has also been identified as an important 
privacy factor (Culnan, 1993; Hine & Eve, 1998).  
Annacker et al.  (2001) identify legitimacy of a data request 
as a significant driver for privacy costs, i.e., the lower the 
perceived legitimacy of the data request the more privacy 
individuals felt they were giving away.  Drawing from the 
concept of “contextual integrity” (see Nissenbaum, 2004), 
O‟Hara & Shadbolt (2008) describe examples in which 
there is a negative reaction to a type of data request in one 
context, but not another: e.g. collecting data about one‟s 
marital status may be appropriate during a date, but is 
inappropriate in the context of a job interview.  In a 
previous study, Jennett et al.  (2011) suggested that 
transparency of purpose of data requests, in the context of 
credit applications, could make individuals feel more 
comfortable with answering questions.  Thus, in the current 
study we advance the following hypothesis: 
H2: Participants will disclose more data when a reason for 
the data request is given, compared to when no reason 
is given. 
Privacy Values 
Individual differences may also contribute to different 
privacy perceptions of specific data requests:  some 
individuals are more sensitive to privacy issues than others.  
There have been several attempts to develop ways to 
measure privacy concern (see Buchanan et al., 2007 for a 
review).  One of the most widely used privacy scales is 
Westin Privacy segmentation (Harris & Associates Inc.  & 
Westin, 1998), which requires participants to rate three 
statements on a 4-level scale.  Based on their answers 
participants are assigned to one of three groups: (1) privacy 
fundamentalists, who have strong feelings about privacy 
and are very defensive of their personal data; (2) privacy 
unconcerned, who don‟t have many concerns about privacy 
or disclosing personal data; and (3) privacy pragmatists, the 
majority of people, who are willing to disclose personal 
data when they see a legitimate use for it and see the 
benefits of doing so (Taylor, 2003).  In our study, we expect 
participants categorized as privacy fundamentalists to be 
more protective of their personal data, therefore, our third 
hypothesis states that: 
H3: Privacy fundamentalists will disclose less data than 
privacy unconcerned or privacy pragmatists. 
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Privacy Attitudes vs.  Privacy Behavior  
Privacy research has identified a discrepancy between 
stated privacy attitudes and concern and actual disclosure 
behavior (see Acquisti, 2004; and Berendt & Spiekermann, 
2005).  Most privacy research has relied on data collection 
techniques such as questionnaires and interviews to capture 
privacy perceptions and attitudes. In the past two decades, 
several surveys have identified privacy as a serious concern 
for consumers and citizens in general (Federal Trade 
Commission, 1998; Business Week/Harris Poll, 1998; Pew 
Internet & American Life Project, 2000; Jupiter Research, 
2002); yet there are many documented examples of 
individuals surrendering their personal data for seemingly 
small rewards (Eskenzi, 2008; Kourti, 2009). Thus, it is 
important to observe how people act in situations where 
they are confronted with real trade-offs involving their 
personal data, rather than just ask them about hypothetical 
scenarios.  Our study explores the difference between the 
stated acceptability of some questions, and the actual 
disclosure behavior of the same participants on those 
questions. 
Actual privacy behavior is guided by cost-benefit 
considerations.  When organizations providing a service 
request personal data from individuals, these assess the 
potential economic or social benefits that will result from 
the exchange, and weigh them against the costs of 
providing the data (Milne & Gordon, 1993; Phelps et al., 
2000).  If the benefits are perceived to outweigh the costs, 
individuals will agree to the exchange; if they do not, they 
will withhold or falsify data to reduce the privacy costs, 
while still obtaining the benefits of the exchange (Horne, 
2007; Metzger, 2007).   
Some studies have investigated disclosure behavior when 
economic rewards (such as money, future convenience or 
time savings) are offered in exchange for personal data 
(Grossklags & Acquisti, 2007; Hann et al.  2002a; 2002b; 
Hui et al.  2007).  Results indicate that there is a point – 
albeit variable from context to context - at which 
individuals will trade their data for material benefits.  When 
individuals apply for credit there is also a potential 
economic reward that can be obtained through the 
disclosure of personal data.  However, to our knowledge, no 
empirical research has been conducted on privacy 
perceptions and decision-making in the context of credit 
application forms.  It is not clear whether privacy decision-
making when individuals apply for credit follows the same 
rules as in other contexts.  The research described here tries 
to address this gap in the literature by simulating an 
application process for a credit card that requires different 
types of personal data to be disclosed. 
In the following section we describe our experimental 
design.  We start by describing a preliminary survey aimed 
at collecting sensitivity ratings for several data items which 
are not currently used in risk assessment but which experts 
believe may be associated with financial behavior. We then 
describe our main experimental study which investigated 
participants‟ disclosure behavior in the context of a 
simulated credit card application. 
PRELIMINARY SURVEY 
Demographics 
A UK nationally representative sample of 285 participants 
answered the survey. 181 (63.5%) were female and 104 
male (36.5%). 45 (15.8%) were between 18 and 24 years 
old, 36 (12.6%) between 25 and 39 years old, 100 (35.1%) 
between 40 and 59, 104 were 60 years old or over. 
Survey 
We generated 53 hypothetical questions which are thought 
to have relevance for assessing creditworthiness, but which 
are not normally collected in loan application processes.  
These include “internet payment history”, “any insurance 
claims”, “list of friends from your social networking sites”.  
For each item, participants were asked to rate on a 5-point 
scale to what extent they were comfortable with giving a 
lender this data. 
After an initial principal components analysis (PCA) with 
Cattell‟s scree plot method, we identified five main factors 
that the 53 questions varied on.  These five factors 
accounted for 57% of the total variance.  The varimax 
rotation provided a far more interpretable solution than the 
direct oblimin rotation.  Therefore the varimax rotation was 
interpreted.  The five factors produced were seen to have 
common themes in the items they contained and as such 
were given the tags: (1) Personal/sensitive, (2) Bills, (3) 
Attitudes, (4) Social network, and (5) Partners and 
Children.  We selected 14 items for use in the experimental 
study (see Table 2 below) that were representative of these 
factors – but that could also be changed into a question that 
could be “responded to” by a participant. 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY  
Demographics 
There were 48 participants in the study.  Ages ranged from 
19 to 31 years, average age 20 years old (s=1.97).  Thirty 
five (72.9%) participants were female and 13 (27.1%) were 
male.  Thirty six (75%) participants were UCL psychology 
students; 8 (16.7%) were students in other degrees at UCL; 
2 (4.2%) were students at other universities; and 1 (2.1%) 
was not a student. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they would be helping to test 
“the acceptability of the application process for a new 
Super Credit Card that beats all other cards on the market. 
Because the deal is so good it can only be offered to people 
who are very reliable at repaying.  The bank (we cannot 
reveal which one because of commercial sensitivity) thinks 
it has discovered a better way of assessing financial 
responsibility, but it requires more and also different 
information than is used in the standard credit reference 
reports.” 
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The application process consisted of an online application 
form with 24 questions.  Participants were asked to 
complete and submit the form. They could submit once they 
had answered at least 20 out of the 24 questions, and were 
paid £5 (approx. $8) regardless of whether they were able 
to submit the form or not.  Participants were told that no 
actual credit card would be awarded, but that the person 
who was found to be most creditworthy would receive a 
£50 (approx. $80) prize.  One factor that could potentially 
affect the way personal data disclosure decisions are made 
in the context of credit applications is the large value of the 
credit service being offered compared to the privacy cost of 
disclosing sensitive data.  Thus, this reward was meant to 
create a real trade-off between disclosing personal data and 
obtaining an economic benefit similar to what happens in 
real life credit applications.   
To disincentivize submission of false data, participants 
were told that “the card can only be offered to people that 
are completely honest during the application procedure, if 
you lie on a single item you are not eligible.  […] all 
application data is being sent to a credit reference agency 
for validation… [using a] … sophisticated combination of 
cross-comparisons between data in the application form, 
the individual’s current credit record, and also comparison 
to the Agency’s most advance customer profiling system.” 
Again, the goal was to simulate as realistically as possible a 
real application process for obtaining credit.   
After filling in the application form, participants answered 
Westin‟s privacy segmentation questions, and were 
interviewed about the acceptability if the form‟s questions 
and whether they had engaged in any privacy protection 
behaviors (such as lying). Participants were told that this 
questionnaire and interview were not part of the evaluation 
of the bank‟s application form, but instead part of the 
research group‟s own investigation into the acceptability of 
the data requests.  They were further reassured that the 
experimenters would not share the interview data with the 
bank. 
To prevent bias, the study was conducted “double-blind”. 
The experimenters who processed the participants – three 
psychology students - were told the same story as 
participants.   The experimenters were told that the research 
group was conducting a consumer acceptance trial of the 
new application process for the bank, and also wanted to 
determine if people would be inclined to lie on those forms. 
The study design was submitted to the university‟s ethics 
approval process, and received approval before the study 
commenced. After the study participants had been 
processed, experimenters and participants were informed 
(face-to-face and by email respectively) that the bank did 
not really exist.  The £50 reward was given to a participant 
selected at random out of those who did submit. 
Application Form 
The application form in the current study began with 10 
Basic questionnaire items that are present on existing credit 
application forms (see Table 1 below).  These were 
included to make participants believe that the data was 
really going to be checked against credit reference agency 
data, and be used by the bank to identify them.  We also 
assumed that - given how the study was advertised - 
participants would expect that they had to provide these 
items – giving a baseline to compare the more sensitive 
items with. 
Table 1 - List of Basic Items 
Items 
1. Full name 
2. Gender 
3. Date of birth 
4. Current Home Address 
5. Mobile phone number  
6. Home phone number  
7. Nationality 
8. Employment status 
9. Have you had a credit card before?  
10. What is the name of your bank?  
 
These were followed by the 14 Novel items. Responses 
were either textual data, or required the participant to tick a 
box to state that he/she consented to their data being looked 
up by the bank. 
Table 2 - List of Novel Items 
Items 
1. Did any of your loved ones die while you were 
growing up?  Please give their relation to you 
(e.g. mother, brother, friend, etc.) 
2. Do you suffer from any medical conditions?  
Please list... 
3. Did you live with both your mother and father 
while you were growing up? 
4. Could you list the names and either phone 
numbers or email addresses of three of your 
closest friends? 
5. Do you give us permission to contact your local 
council to get a copy of your council tax payment 
history?   
6. Do you give us permission to obtain a copy of 
your TV licence payment history?  
7. Do you give us permission to obtain a copy of 
your gas or electricity payment history?   
8. Please provide the name and address (or other 
contact details) of a previous employer so that we 
can request a copy of the last recommendation 
from him / her about you... 
9. What is the job of your partner / spouse?  Please 
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describe... 
10. What are the names of 3 people that you are 
friends with on a social networking site 
(facebook, twitter) whose profiles you would be 
happy share with us?  Please list... 
11. What are the names of 3 people that you are 
friends with on a professional networking site 
(LinkedIn, Orkut) whose profiles you would be 
happy share with us?  Please list... 
12. Will you allow us to measure the typical number 
and length of messages between you and your 
friends on social networking sites? 
13. What is the length of the longest relationship you 
have had with a partner / spouse?  (years/ 
months/ weeks) 
14. May we obtain a copy of your insurance claims 
(e.g. car, house)?   
 
A progress bar was set up so that participants had to give a 
certain amount of data before they could submit their 
application to the bank (see Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1 - Application Form Progress Bar 
We deliberately set the threshold high (20/24) to increase 
the likelihood of participants providing some Novel data 
items: even if participants gave all Basic data (10 items), 
they needed to provide 10 of the 14 Novel items.  If 
participants tried to submit their answers before the 
progress bar reached 100%, they received an error message 
(see Figure 2). If participants chose “not applicable” (N/A), 
this did not contribute towards the tally, since in a real 
credit application, an applicant would have to submit 
alternative data items if s/he was unable to answer a 
question. 
 
Figure 2 - Insufficient Information Error Message 
This was part of the deception: when a participant clicked 
“submit”, their data was not sent anywhere, but deleted 
instead, i.e. no record of the content of participants‟ 
responses was kept.  Instead, experimenters‟ kept notes on 
which questions participants answered in the form.  
Experimenters did record audio of the post-scenario 
interviews for later analysis. 
Different Versions of the Application Form 
Past research suggests that individuals are more 
comfortable with disclosing personal data when they 
understand and agree with the purpose of its collection and 
how it going to be used (e.g.: Culnan, 1993; Hine & Eve, 
1998; Adams & Sasse, 2001).  To test this, we set up two 
versions of the form: 
 Explanation condition: Participants were given a 
brief explanation of why each item was needed by 
the bank (small text that was presented below the 
item) 
 No Explanation condition: Participants were not 
given an explanation of why each item was needed 
by the bank. 
For example, for half of the participants the question “Did 
any of your loved ones die while you were growing up? “ 
was accompanied by the following explanation: “We need 
this information to help judge how your early experiences 
might shape your behavior as an adult – early loss has been 
related to later financial behavior.” 
For each of these conditions, we created a Normal Order 
version and a Reverse Order version to control for item 
order.  In both versions the 10 Basic items were always 
presented first.  In the normal order the Novel items were 
presented as above in Table 2 – and in the reverse order the 
Novel items were presented in reverse. 
Privacy Values Questionnaire and Follow-Up Interview 
As noted in the Background section, there is evidence that 
some people are more privacy-sensitive than others.  Thus, 
as well as controlling for age and gender, we also collected 
level of privacy concern as assessed by the Westin privacy 
segmentation (Harris and  & Westin, 1998).  In the Westin 
scale participants are asked to rate three statements on a 4-
point Likert type scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 4 = 
strongly agree.  The three statements are: 
 Consumers have lost all control over how personal 
information is collected and used by companies 
 Most businesses handle the personal information 
they collect about consumers in a proper and 
confidential way  
 Existing laws and organizational practices provide 
a reasonable level of protection for consumer 
privacy today 
Privacy fundamentalists are respondents who agreed 
(strongly or somewhat) with the first statement and 
disagreed (strongly or somewhat) with the second and third 
statements.  Privacy unconcerned are respondents who 
disagreed with the first statement and agreed with the 
second and third statements.  All other respondents are 
categorized as privacy pragmatists. 
A short interview followed, where participants were invited 
to discuss the acceptability of each of the 24 questions in 
the application form.  If they had decided not to submit the 
form they were asked about their reasons.  They were also 
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asked about whether they had lied on or exaggerated any of 
their answers.  
RESULTS  
Submission and Answer Rates 
Twenty eight (58.3%) participants submitted the application 
form, which means they answered at least 20 questions out 
of the 24 asked.  All participants answered at least one 
question however, even participants that did not submit the 
form, and the answer rate across all participants for each 
question is shown below in Table 3. 
Of the ten Basic information items, 6 were answered by all 
participants for whom they were applicable (100%), 3 were 
not answered by one participant each for who they were 
applicable (98%), 1 was not answered by two participants 
for whom it was applicable (92%), giving an average 
answer rate of 99% of people for the Basic items. 
The answer rate for Novel items was lower, averaging 85% 
and ranging from 100% to 44% of participants answering 
data items that applied to them.  Only one of the Novel data 
items was answered by all respondents – “Grew up with 
both mother and father”.   
Testing the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the answer rate for each data 
item request would be correlated with the sensitivity of the 
item as measured in the preliminary survey (see Preliminary 
Survey section).  This hypothesis was supported: the 
percentage of participants who answered an item (excluding 
N/A answers) was significantly correlated with the 
sensitivity of that item (measured on a 5-point comfort 
scale) ρ = 0.624, p<0.01. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that participants would be more willing 
to disclose personal data in the version of the form where a 
justification was given for each question.  The data did not 
support this hypothesis.  There was no association between 
the presence of explanations for the questions and whether 
participants submitted the form or not: χ2(1) = 0.34, which 
is below the critical value of 3.84 (p=0.05).  There was also 
no association between the presence of explanations and the 
number of questions participants answered: t value was not 
significant (p=0.05).  Finally, there was no association 
between the presence of explanations and whether 
participants had answered a particular question: Pearson‟s 
Chi Square or Fisher‟s Exact Tests were conducted for each 
item and none were significant (p=0.05).  
Table 3 - Answer Rates 
Item N Answered Not Answered Not Applicable 
(N/A) 
% 
Answered 
% Answered  
(excluding N/A) 
Grew up with both mother and father 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Current home address 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Employment status 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Gender 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Mobile phone number 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Nationality 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Full name 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Date of birth 48 47 1 0 97.9% 97.9% 
Ever had a credit card 48 47 1 0 97.9% 97.9% 
Loved ones passed away while growing up 48 45 3 0 93.8% 93.8% 
Name of your bank 48 45 1 2 93.8% 97.8% 
Copy of TV licence payment history 48 28 1 19 58.3% 96.6% 
Medical conditions 48 45 3 0 93.8% 93.8% 
Copy of gas / electricity payment history 48 38 3 7 79.2% 92.7% 
Home phone number 48 24 2 22 50.0% 92.3% 
Length of longest relationship 48 34 3 11 70.8% 91.9% 
Copy of council tax payment history 48 24 3 21 50.0% 88.9% 
Previous employer contact details 48 26 4 18 54.2% 86.7% 
Social networking profiles of 3 friends 48 37 6 5 77.1% 86.0% 
Copy of insurance claims 48 23 4 21 47.9% 85.2% 
Job of partner / spouse 48 17 3 28 35.4% 85.0% 
Number and length of mobile text messages 48 33 13 2 68.8% 71.7% 
Name and phone number / email of 3 friends 48 33 15 0 68.8% 68.8% 
Professional networking profiles of 3 friends 48 4 5 39 8.3% 44.4% 
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Hypothesis 3 stated that participants categorized as privacy 
fundamentalists according to Westin‟s privacy scale would 
be less willing to disclose data.  This hypothesis was 
supported by the data, but only when privacy unconcerned 
and privacy pragmatists were blocked. When comparing 
the behavior of privacy fundamentalists against that of 
privacy pragmatists and unconcerned separately no 
statistically significant relationship was found. We believed 
that we did not have enough participants for the test to have 
enough power to detect the difference. In order to increase 
the power of the test, we attempted to sharpen the 
differences in predicted behavior between the 
segmentations by contrasting fundamentalists with the other 
two Westin segmentation groups, using the statistical 
technique of blocking. There was a significant association 
between whether participants were privacy fundamentalists 
and whether they submitted the form χ2(1) = 4.39, p < 0.05.  
Based on the odds ratio, the odds of a person submitting the 
form were 5.6 times higher if they were non-
fundamentalists. 
Acceptability of Data Requests 
We transcribed the recordings of the post-session 
interviews and analyzed participants‟ comments using 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  We identified 
several factors that influence the acceptability of a data 
request (see Figure 3, the frequencies of participants that 
mentioned each theme are between parentheses).  These 
factors help clarify why some data requests are considered 
acceptable while others are not. 
 
Figure 3 - Acceptability Themes 
The acceptability of a data request is related to its perceived 
relevance.  A relevant data request is one where the data 
item is perceived to be related to financial behavior, 
personality of the applicant, or probability of debt 
repayment.  Relevant data requests were perceived more 
positively than irrelevant ones: 
“I don’t think it’s acceptable, it’s got nothing to do with my 
credit status” P6 
“Yeah it’s good, because the bank needs to know how much 
income you’ve got” P13 
Some participants questioned the fairness of using certain 
items to assess an applicant.  Fairness perceptions are 
associated with relevance perceptions; however, while 
perceived relevance seems to be related to how acceptable 
it is to use an item to draw conclusions from a statistical 
point of view, perceived fairness is related to how 
acceptable it is to use the item from an ethical perspective.   
Perceptions of the consequences of disclosing a data item 
had an influence on acceptability as well.  When 
participants thought that a data disclosure would result in a 
positive or neutral outcome, they saw it as more acceptable.  
On the other hand, participants perceived data disclosures 
they thought could harm them in future as less acceptable: 
“I did reply, I answered, but only because I don’t suffer 
from a medical condition.  Probably if I did I might have 
reacted differently.” P17 
“I did disclose it on the answers because again I had 
nothing to hide, it would all go in my favor.” P29 
 “I know that because I have medical conditions it could be 
used to discriminate against me.” P40 
The sensitivity of a data request has an influence on how 
acceptable it is perceived to be.  When participants 
considered a request too personal, sensitive, or invasive, 
they perceived it as less acceptable. 
“I found that very intrusive.  I don’t think that’s 
acceptable.” P48 
Requests for data related to third parties, such as 
colleagues or friends of the participants, were perceived as 
less acceptable: 
“[S]haring other people’s details is always something I find 
like quite hard to do.” P48 
Participants said they feared their friends might be hassled 
by the bank, that disclosing their data would be a privacy 
invasion, that it was not their data to give, and that their 
friends had not consented for their data to be disclosed: 
“I wouldn’t really want them to impose on my friends’ 
personal space without them giving consent to that.” P25 
The effort required to answer a data request may also 
impact how it is perceived with request that are involve 
more work being seen more negatively: 
“It would be difficult to get hold of the information, so 
again I was less inclined to provide it.” P30 
“Depending on how long the form is, I wouldn’t mind doing 
it.” P36 
Data 
Request 
Relevance 
(44) 
Fairness 
(6) 
Outcome 
(19) 
Sensitivity 
(28) 
3rd Parties 
(24) 
Effort 
(3) 
Availability 
(6) 
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Asking for data that was already publicly available from 
other sources was perceived by some participants as more 
acceptable.  In fact, a couple of participants even disclosed 
items they thought were unacceptable because they 
believed the data was already public: 
“Yes I thought this was acceptable, insofar that social 
networking sites are sort of publicly accessible, and so 
giving the details of people with whom I have connections 
on these sort of sites is a reasonable thing to ask.” P23 
Acceptability and Disclosure 
As expected, the acceptability ratings of items correlated 
significantly with their previously measured sensitivity 
ratings, ρ = 0.607, p<0.01.  However, the association 
between participants finding an item acceptable and 
disclosing it was only significant for 3 questions: insurance 
claims χ2(2) = 10.44, p<0.05, council tax χ2(2) = 10.10, 
p<0.05, and emails and phone numbers of friends χ2(2) = 
8.42, p<0.05 
For some items there was no association between 
acceptability and disclosure rate because every participant 
(or almost every participant) found the item acceptable and 
disclosed it.  There were several items which a large 
proportion of participants found unacceptable, but still 
disclosed (see Table 4). 
Participants who answered data requests they considered 
unacceptable were asked why they did.  Fourteen 
participants said that, on reflection, they did not mind 
disclosing the data:   
 “I did, though I felt I shouldn’t...  they don’t need to know 
that [...] although I did answer the question, because then I 
thought it might not be that bad.” P17 
Ten participants answered that even though they considered 
a question generally unacceptable, they personally had no 
problem with answering it:   
“Again I did disclose it, but I don’t think the general public 
would be happy […] because I see myself as quite an open 
person, so I would be happy.” P28 
Five participants said they did disclose because they 
wanted to complete the form: 
“I did disclose some things mainly just to complete the 
questionnaire.  But it didn’t seem a great question.” P27 
Other reasons for answering unacceptable data requests 
included: 
1. Answering is not harmful to me (4 participants); 
2. The data is publicly available anyway (2 
participants); 
3. The bank will not actually look at the data (2 
participants); 
4. Wasn’t thinking about it when I answered (1 
participant); 
5. I felt safe answering because I was part of a study 
(1 participant). 
Privacy Protection Behaviors 
All participants were asked during the post-experiment 
interview if they had lied or exaggerated on some items 
when completing the form: 22.9% of participants said that 
they had.  Examples include saying that the bank could 
check on their electricity bills when they actually do not 
pay any, and writing friends‟ initials instead of their names.  
One reason mentioned to do this was to increase the amount 
of data disclosed to the minimum required to be able to 
submit the form.  Another reason given was to protect the 
privacy of friends. 
Table 4 - Acceptability vs. Disclosure 
Item N1 Found unacceptable 
but disclosed 
% found unacceptable 
but disclosed 
% found unacceptable but 
disclosed (excluding N/A) 
Loved ones passed away while growing up 46 26 56.5% 56.5% 
Social networking profiles of 3 friends 47 25 53.2% 61.0% 
Name and phone number / email of 3 friends 47 20 42.6% 42.6% 
Number and length of mobile text messages 46 19 41.3% 43.2% 
Length of longest relationship 47 18 38.3% 50.0% 
Grew up with both mother and father 44 18 40.9% 40.9% 
Medical conditions 46 11 23.9% 23.9% 
Professional networking profiles of 3 friends 45 3 6.7% 33.3% 
Job of partner / spouse 46 3 6.5% 15.8% 
Copy of insurance claims 41 2 4.9% 7.1% 
Previous employer contact details 46 2 4.3% 6.7% 
Copy of TV license payment history 45 2 4.4% 7.1% 
Copy of gas / electricity payment history 45 1 2.2% 2.8% 
Copy of council tax payment history 46 1 2.2% 3.8% 
1
 Participants who, in the interview, did not answer clearly whether they found an item acceptable or not were deleted pairwise 
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DISCUSSION 
Our study investigated the role of sensitivity, transparency, 
and privacy values in decision-making about disclosure in 
the context of a simulated credit card application form.  We 
also wanted to explore the interaction between stated 
acceptability of a data request, and disclosure behavior 
regarding the same data request. 
Sensitivity, Transparency, and Privacy Values  
Hypothesis 1 stated that the number of participants sharing 
each data item would be inversely correlated with the 
sensitivity of the data items.  In fact, the answer rates for 
each question showed a significant negative correlation 
with the sensitivity rating of the question (as measured in a 
previous study), thus supporting the hypothesis. Past 
research found that more sensitive items were more likely 
to be withheld (Metzger, 2007).  The importance of our 
finding is that it can be used to estimate a priori how an 
application or registration form will fare, before actually 
deploying it.  Knowing how sensitive certain data items are 
perceived to be in general makes it possible to predict the 
likelihood of applicants withholding such items, and weigh 
the impact of missing data on the lender‟s business 
processes to determine whether it is actually worth 
requesting it. 
H3 stated that privacy fundamentalists would disclose less 
data than privacy unconcerned or privacy pragmatists. As 
expected, participants who were categorized as privacy 
fundamentalists on Westin‟s scale were significantly less 
likely to submit the form than non-fundamentalists.  
Privacy fundamentalists are generally more concerned 
about the risks of their personal data falling into the wrong 
hands and of the harmful effects that disclosing personal 
data can have on their lives (cf. Westin, 2003).  This would 
explain their reluctance in submitting their personal data to 
an unknown party for an uncertain reward, i.e. the reward 
would have to be larger to offset the perceived cost of 
answering and submitting the form. 
H2 predicted that participants would disclose more data 
when a reason for the data request was given than when no 
reason was given.  However, even though previous studies 
identified lack of transparency and legitimacy as promoters 
of negative reactions (Annacker et al., 2001; Jennett et al., 
2011), in our study the presence of explanations for the 
questions being asked had no significant effect on 
participant behavior.  Thus, this hypothesis was not 
supported.  One possible explanation is that participants did 
not notice the explanations positioned below each question.  
Another possibility is that they saw the explanations, but 
did not read them.  Past research on privacy policies found 
that people rarely read them, or other terms online, because 
of the time cost, which has been estimated as an average of 
10 minutes per policy (McDonald and Cranor, 2008) - so 
our participants may not have wanted to spend time reading 
the explanation. If participants read the explanations they 
may not have understood, or believed them – we did not ask 
our participants about this. In future studies, user behavior, 
such as mouse and eye movements, should be tracked to 
check whether participants are noticing and reading the 
explanations. 
Disclosure and Acceptability of Novel Items  
Overall, the disclosure rates for the Novel items (excluding 
N/A answers) can be considered high: 85% or more for all 
but three items. Items related to family history had 
surprisingly high disclosure rates (100% and 93.8% 
respectively for “Grew up with both mother and father” 
and “Loved ones passed away while growing up”), as did 
“Medical conditions” and “Length of longest relationship”. 
These are all items generally considered to be very 
sensitive. 
One possible explanation for the high disclosure rates is 
that no relationship was found between acceptability of a 
question and its disclosure rate. Even though acceptability 
and sensitivity ratings were significantly correlated, the 
acceptability and disclosure rates for individual questions 
were not with many participants both rating questions as 
unacceptable and answering them. For example, 56.5% of 
participants considered the question about “Loved ones 
passed away while growing up” unacceptable, but still 
answered it.  The only exceptions were “Copy of insurance 
claims“, “Copy of council tax payment history”, and “Name 
and phone number/email of 3 friends” 
The thematic analysis provides some insights into why this 
happens.  Several participants said that - even though they 
found a particular question generally unacceptable - they 
personally did not mind answering it.  This suggests that the 
assessment of the acceptability of a data request precedes 
the actual individual cost-benefit evaluation of the 
disclosure.  Participants may believe that it is wrong for a 
lender to ask for particular data items, but feel that in their 
personal case it is beneficial (or not costly) to answer. This 
is further supported by some participants saying they 
answered “unacceptable” questions so they could submit 
the application form. They weighed the effort already 
invested plus the benefit of entering the prize draw against 
the costs of disclosure, and decided for disclosure.  This 
suggests that when individuals answer surveys about 
privacy, they may be answering according to the perceived 
abstract acceptability of certain data practices which may 
differ from their personal cost-benefit assessment in a real 
situation.  This would help explain why a difference 
between privacy attitudes and behaviors has been observed 
in the literature (Acquisti, 2004; Berendt and Spiekermann, 
2005). 
Items relating to social networks had among the lowest 
disclosure rates.  These items included:  
 Number and length of mobile text messages,  
 Name and phone number / email of 3 friends,  
 Professional networking profiles of 3 friends, and  
 Social networking profiles of 3 friends. 
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All of these can be taken as indexes of participants‟ social 
capital.  We have already noted that social capital is related 
to trustworthiness (cf. Lin et al., 2009).  However, these 
data items are about individuals other than the participant 
and with whom the participant is friends. The thematic 
analysis revealed that participants were not comfortable 
revealing data about their friends without their permission. 
Similarly, “Partner‟s job” was among the least disclosed 
items. 
Items related to bill payment history, such as utility, TV 
license, and council tax payment history had high 
disclosure rates, and a low proportion of participants found 
them unacceptable. This gives support to the current trend 
for lenders to use some types of bill payment history as 
indicators of creditworthiness, especially when applicants 
have “thin” credit histories, to make credit scoring more 
accurate. 
Several factors identified in the thematic analysis confirm 
previous results.  In a previous study on applicants‟ 
perceptions of loan application forms (Jennett et al., 2011), 
participants similarly raised issues with: perceived lack of 
relevance of data requests; level of detail needed to reply to 
some requests; potential negative outcome of a disclosure; 
and perceived unfairness of application process.  Relevance 
of a data request, sensitivity of data, and disclosure 
outcome are all also identified by Culnan (1993) when 
reviewing factors which impact perceptions of secondary 
use of information.  Culnan (1993) argues that individuals 
are less likely to perceive that their privacy was invaded 
when the collected personal data is considered to be 
relevant for the interaction taking place and will be used to 
draw reliable conclusions about them.  Sensitivity of data is 
generally considered to be related to privacy perceptions 
(see Adams and Sasse, 2001 for a privacy model in 
multimedia communications, or Metzger, 2007 for findings 
in e-commerce). In a study focused on privacy perceptions 
in serious games, Malheiros et al. (2011) also identified 
perceived outcome of sharing data as an important factor.  
The emergence of factors in our thematic analysis which 
have been identified in studies focused on different types of 
contexts suggest that the process through which individuals 
assess data requests may be context-independent, which 
does not mean the assessments themselves are. 
Privacy Protection Behaviors 
23% of participants admitted to falsifying some of the data 
they submitted as a way to obtain the benefits of submitting 
the form (and the chance to get a £50 prize) while 
minimizing the data actually disclosed.  Metzger‟s (2007) 
study found an almost identical correlation between item 
sensitivity and disclosure (0.61) as this study (0.62), but a 
higher proportion of participants that falsified (40% of 
participants that falsified at least one data item).   Metzger‟s 
participants were asked about falsification in a self-
administered questionnaire, whereas ours were asked face-
to-face by the experimenter.  Survey work to estimate the 
prevalence of socially undesirable behavior (for example 
sexual infidelity in marriage) has found that more people 
admit to these behaviors to self-administered questionnaires 
than to experimenters.  The difference can be large - six 
times as many admitted infidelity when asked by a form 
than by interview (Whisman and Snyder, 2007).  We 
hypothesize that social desirability effects due to the 
presence of experimenters may have led to under reporting 
of falsification in our study, and encourage other 
researchers to address this source of bias more effectively 
when designing their studies, by employing methods that 
are more resistant to this bias, for example: self-report 
questionnaires, or random response techniques (such as 
participants flipping a coin to answer truthfully or answer 
yes; Barnett, 1998) that make it impossible to tell if each 
individual respondent‟s answer is truthful, but allow an 
accurate assessment of the true proportion in the sample as 
a whole. 
No data was collected in this study on the rate of 
falsification per item (we made sure participants‟ data was 
not saved to comply with ethics guidelines), but if a 
relationship could be found between sensitivity of an item 
and its falsification rate (as in Metzger, 2007), then the data 
quality impact for lenders of asking for certain items could 
be bounded. 
Limitations 
Our participants were university students with an average 
age of 20.  We acknowledge that this limits the 
generalizability of our results, and plan to repeat the study 
with a larger, more representative sample.  We would, 
however, argue that the findings of our study have face 
validity when considered in the context of previous results.  
Westin‟s Privacy Segmentation has been repeatedly given 
across many different samples in different years.  A 
consistent finding is that approximately 25% of respondents 
fall into the Privacy Fundamentalist category (Kumaraguru 
and Cranor, 2005).  Our participants had a smaller 
proportion, with 16.7% being Privacy Fundamentalists.  
This agrees with Tsarenko and Tojib‟s (2009) finding that 
young people were more pragmatic in their privacy 
concerns viz financial institutions than other segments of 
the population.  We argue that by being more pragmatic and 
unconcerned than the general population, the disinclination 
shown by our participants for disclosing certain data items 
can be expected in the general population, and that our 
results would form an upper bound for disclosure of these 
items in the general population.  Also, the preliminary 
survey was conducted with a larger (N=285), nationally 
representative sample, and the sensitivity ratings correlated 
significantly with the experimental study‟s disclosure rates; 
thus, contributing to the external validity of our findings.   
CONCLUSIONS 
From a methodological point of view, this study breaks 
with common practice by deceiving participants into 
thinking the data they submitted was actually going to be 
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used to assess financial reliability.  A monetary reward for 
the most creditworthy participant was also offered to nudge 
participants into submitting their form and answering 
questions in a truthful manner.  Furthermore, experimenters 
were under the same deception as the participants, to 
minimize bias. Since privacy decision-making and 
disclosure behavior are highly contextual it is important to 
capture and observe them in conditions as realistic as 
possible. 
A goal of this study was to discover which novel data items 
could potentially be used as alternatives for evidence of 
credit worthiness for applicants who do not have 
conventional credit histories, and so could not otherwise 
participate in and receive the benefits of low cost credit.  
Among the most sensitive of the novel data items studied in 
this research (as measured by sensitivity score and 
disclosure rates) were those relating to people other than the 
participant. Although the results need to be validated with a 
wider socio-demographic (where we estimate individuals to 
be less pragmatic), we consider this study to be a warning 
that use of indices of social capital as signs of 
creditworthiness may currently not be acceptable.  The 
explicit collection of items associated with bill payment 
history, on the other hand, seem to be less sensitive. Items 
such as TV license and council tax payment history, which 
are not currently collected, could be used for credit scoring 
in situations where applicants have “thin” credit histories.   
In the context of applying for credit, we found a direct 
relationship between an item‟s sensitivity, and its likelihood 
of being disclosed, and that this relationship might be 
employed in a cost/benefit analysis during the design phase 
for credit application procedures.  However, care must be 
taken in choice of language when assessing sensitivity 
using survey methods: we found that similar language can 
tap quite distinct constructs that relate very differently to 
observed behavior.  We found no relationship between 
items‟ “acceptability” and their disclosure; many people 
disclosed information whilst reporting that the antecedent 
information requests were unacceptable.  We hypothesize 
that there are two separate but related tests employed by 
credit applicants for assessing information requests – one 
for testing the requests‟ general acceptability (that has little 
impact on disclosure behaviors), and one with respect to the 
individual‟s costs and benefits (with much greater impact 
on disclosure). 
A growing body of privacy research is starting to look at 
privacy decision-making as outcome-oriented: individuals 
assess the costs and benefits of trading their personal data 
for some kind of reward. Our research provides some 
insights into the factors that guide this decision-making 
process.  
The impact of perceived relevance and fairness in particular 
should be of note to any organization that collects personal 
data and uses it for profiling purposes. Empirical score-
carding (Hand et al., 2008), for example, may find a 
relationship between a data item and likelihood of default 
which, while statistically sound, may not be understood by 
applicants. In fact, these relationships are usually kept 
hidden from applicants to prevent gaming of the application 
process, which makes it more difficult for applicants to 
perceive the relevance of certain data requests. 
Furthermore, even if the collection of certain types of data 
is seen as statistically relevant, applicants may still consider 
the practice unfair or unethical. 
We detected no effect of request transparency on disclosure 
– participants were just as likely to disclose data whether or 
not an explanation was given for the request. This suggests 
that, in contexts where there is a low perceived relevance of 
data requests, organizations should explore new ways to 
assure individuals that their data collection and data use 
practices are actually relevant and fair.    
We also found that 23% of our participants admitted to 
falsifying, exaggerating or omitting information when 
completing our simulated application form.  We have no 
data with which to compare an item‟s sensitivity to its 
falsification rate in the context of applying for credit – a 
topic that requires further studies in which participants‟ 
responses are retained and verified through more robust 
processes.  
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